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Financing Adaptation to Climate Change: 
Issues and Priorities 
Richard J.T. Klein and Åsa Persson 
ECP Report No. 8/October 2008 
Introduction 
The Bali Action Plan, agreed in December 2007, launched a comprehensive process to enable the 
full, effective and sustained implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in 
order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision in Copenhagen in December 2009. The Bali 
Action Plan attaches equal weight to mitigation and adaptation, and identifies technology and 
finance as the key mechanisms to enable developing countries to respond to climate change. 
The past decade has seen a surge in research and policy analysis on ways in which technology and 
finance can support mitigation. Similar studies for adaptation are much more recent, and their 
results therefore less mature. This is a potential bottleneck in the negotiations towards an 
agreement in Copenhagen. This paper aims to facilitate discussions on adaptation finance by 
presenting a summary overview of the current state of knowledge and policy initiatives, and by 
outlining a number of issues that would need to be considered in the negotiation process. 
Financial Needs for Adaptation 
Adaptation to climate change will bring with it additional costs for both the public and the private 
sector. However, assessing the costs and, especially, the benefits of adaptation is considerably more 
complicated than it is for mitigation. Most importantly, in contrast to mitigation the performance of 
adaptation options cannot be measured and expressed in a single metric, e.g. CO2 or US dollars 
(designated hereafter as $). This makes it difficult for decision-makers to compare between 
alternative adaptation options and to consider potential trade-offs. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) 
observed that the current literature on adaptation costs and benefits is quite limited and fragmented, 
and that equity considerations (i.e. the distribution of costs and benefits) are hardly addressed at all 
(Adger et al., 2007). A recent review by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) on the same subject (Agrawala & Fankhauser, 2008) found that there is very 
little quantified information on the costs of adaptation in developing countries, and most studies are 
constrained to a few sectors within countries (mostly coastal zones, to a lesser extent water, 
agriculture and health). In addition, these studies adopt relatively crude relationships and strong 
assumptions (e.g. perfect foresight and high levels of autonomous adaptation). There are almost no 
cross-sector studies that look at cumulative effects within countries, and only a handful of studies 
that look at the wider macro-economic consequences of impacts or adaptation. Moreover, most of 
the literature considers adaptation to average changes in temperature or sea-level rise only; very 
little attention has been given to more abrupt changes in mean conditions and to changes in the 
frequency and magnitude of extreme events. 
In spite of these challenges, a number of organisations have recently published aggregate estimates 
of financial needs for adaptation. The UNFCCC secretariat estimated the additional investment and 
financial flows needed worldwide to be $60–182 billion in 2030 (UNFCCC, 2007a), some $28–67 
billion of which would be needed in developing countries. The largest uncertainty in these 
estimates is in the cost of adapting infrastructure, which may require anything between $8–130 
billion in 2030, one-third of which would be for developing countries. The UNFCCC secretariat 2 | KLEIN & PERSSON 
 
also estimated that an additional $52–62 billion would be needed for agriculture, water, health, 
ecosystem protection and coastal-zone protection, most of which would be used in developing 
countries (UNFCCC, 2007a). 
Others arrived at similar estimates. The World Bank (2006) concluded that the incremental costs of 
adapting to projected impacts of climate change in developing countries are likely to be in the order 
of $9–41 billion per year, while Oxfam International (2007) estimated this number to be over $50 
billion per year. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has the most pessimistic 
estimate to date: it suggested that by 2015 financing requirements for adaptation in developing 
countries could amount to $86–109 billion per year (Watkins, 2007). The reason for these 
organisations to focus on developing countries is that the financial needs for adaptation in these 
countries are a factor in global climate policy, as opposed to those in developed countries. This 
does not imply that adaptation is not important for developed countries, but rather that it is a 
domestic issue that does not require the involvement of the international community. 
The above numbers are now widely cited to demonstrate the need to increase the availability of 
funds for adaptation in developing countries. However, Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) expressed 
concern about the methodology of the studies. They argued that there has been “a premature and 
very rapid convergence around initial estimates that are quite sensitive to the assumptions made.” 
For example, all subsequent studies adopted the World Bank’s assumptions that 40% of official 
development assistance (ODA), 10% of foreign direct investment and 2–10% of gross domestic 
investment are climate-sensitive, and that the cost of climate-proofing the exposed investments is 
10–20% of the financial exposure in each of these cases. According to Agrawala and Fankhauser 
(2008), the “consensus” on global adaptation costs, even in order of magnitude terms, may 
therefore be premature. In addition, in most cases the estimates do not have a direct attribution to 
specific adaptation activities, nor are the benefits of adaptation investments articulated. There are 
also issues of double-counting between sectors, and scaling up to global levels from a very limited 
(and often very local) evidence base. At the same time, many sectors and adaptations have not been 
included in the estimates. 
In response to new policy developments and possibly to address some of the above concerns, a 
number of organisations have initiated follow-up activities. For example, the UNFCCC secretariat 
is preparing an update of its 2007 report, to be completed before the 14th session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP14) in Poznan in December 2008. It will take into account the Bali Action Plan 
but not contain new cost analyses. Instead it will provide an overview of the various options and 
proposals available to generate and deliver the necessary financing to address climate change, 
including through adaptation. The UNDP has launched a capacity development project to assist up 
to twenty developing countries in conducting investment and financial flow assessments across 
different sectors and economic activities through 2030. The effort, which runs until December 
2009, builds on the methodological approach developed by the 2007 UNFCCC report. 
Adaptation: More than Technology Transfer and Deployment 
The traditional view of adaptation tends to assume that a national government is responsible for 
implementing technological adaptation measures (e.g. new seed varieties, dams, early-warning 
systems and irrigation schemes) based on specific knowledge of future climate conditions (e.g. 
Carter et al., 1994). The above estimates of financial needs rely in large part on studies that took 
such a technology-based view of adaptation. However, this view has been challenged for three 
reasons (e.g. Smithers & Smit, 1997; Burton et al., 2002; Adger et al., 2003). 
First, even though climate science has made great advances over the past years, it often remains 
difficult to project future impacts of climate change in sufficient detail to justify investment in 
technological adaptation measures, in particular on a local scale. An important uncertainty relates FINANCING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE | 3 
 
to the effect of a changing climate on the frequency, magnitude and spatial occurrence of extreme 
weather events, such as floods, cyclones and droughts. Planning specific measures based on 
projections of future climate conditions therefore presents a great challenge to developing 
countries. 
Second, technological adaptation measures can be important in reducing vulnerability to climate 
change, but they do have their limitations. Three issues need to be considered here (Klein et al., 
2007): 
•  Technological adaptation measures may be only partially effective if they do not address non-
climate factors that contribute to vulnerability to climate change. For example, the 
technological improvement of a water supply system to ensure the availability of water during 
dry spells will be of limited benefit to people who do not have access to this water. The 
inequitable distribution of water rights or the price of the water may be more important factors 
in causing vulnerability to drought than deficient water supply technology. 
•  Technological adaptation measures may be ineffective if they are not suited to local conditions. 
For example, new drought-resistant crop varieties may indeed be very resistant to drought, but 
their acceptance in a community also depends on their costs and availability, access to fertiliser 
and other inputs, storage constraints, ease of preparation, flavour and so on. 
•  Technological adaptation measures may turn out to be maladaptive if they are implemented 
without recognition of relevant social and environmental processes. For example, new coastal 
infrastructure could disturb the offshore sediment balance, resulting in erosion in adjacent 
coastal areas. Irrigation can lead to the salinisation of groundwater and the degradation of 
wetlands, as well as leaving subsistence farmers with reduced access to groundwater and 
productive land. 
Third, the traditional view of adaptation does not take into account the reliance of adaptation on 
development, and vice versa. People are vulnerable not only to climate change but to a range of 
other stresses, depending on factors such as health status, education and other socio-environmental 
circumstances shaped by political and economic processes (Kelly & Adger, 2000; O’Brien et al., 
2004). Government initiatives and technological measures designed to adapt to specific changes in 
climate may therefore fail to address the issues considered as most urgent by local communities. 
These issues may include access to water and food, health and sanitation, education and livelihood 
security. 
These three reasons for taking a broader, development-based view of adaptation suggest that the 
above estimates of financial needs may not reflect the reality of adaptation, and add to the concerns 
expressed by Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008). However, it is difficult to say whether this then 
implies the estimates are too high or too low. It does suggest that the process of adapting to climate 
change in developing countries is more complex than negotiators anticipated when they agreed on 
the UNFCCC in 1992. This complexity, and its implications for adaptation finance, is discussed in 
the remainder of this paper. 
Adaptation, Development or Both? 
The first empirical studies of climate adaptation (reviewed and assessed in the IPCC AR4 by Adger 
et al., 2007) showed that the success of adaptation in developing countries relies strongly on 
broader development progress. When adaptation is limited to responses specific to climate change, 
it neglects the fact that vulnerability to climate change does not emerge in isolation. For example, it 
may help to provide a rural household that grows a particular subsistence crop with a more 
drought-resistant variety, but a more robust and comprehensive adaptation strategy would seek to 
improve food security through a set of coordinated measures that include agricultural extension, 4 | KLEIN & PERSSON 
 
crop diversification, integrated pest management and rainwater harvesting. In addition, a poor rural 
household is more likely to use these options if it has a literate family member, if it has access to 
investment capital through local financial institutions, if it enjoys relatively intact social networks, 
and if it can hold policymakers accountable. In other words, it takes more than narrow, climate-
focused measures to build adaptive capacity. 
A recent study by McGray et al. (2007) confirmed this view. It reviewed more than 100 initiatives 
labelled as adaptation in developing countries and found that in practice there is little difference 
between these adaptation initiatives and what can be considered good development. The difference 
lies more in the definition of the problem and the setting of priorities than in the implementation of 
solutions. The study presented adaptation as a continuum, ranging from more narrowly defined 
activities aimed specifically at addressing impacts of climate change, to building response capacity 
and addressing the drivers of vulnerability (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Adaptation as a continuum from addressing the drivers of vulnerability to confronting the 
impacts of climate change 
Addressing the drivers
of vulnerability
Activities seek to
reduce poverty and
other non-climatic
stressors that make
people vulnerable
Building response
capacity
Activities seek to build
robust systems for
problem-solving
Managing climate
risks
Activities seek to
incorporate climate
information into
decision-making
Confronting climate
change
Activities seek to
address impacts
associated exclusively
with climate change
Traditional development funding New and additional adaptation funding
Vulnerability focus Impacts focus
 
Source: Adapted from McGray et al. (2007). 
Many developing countries have already begun to integrate climate risks into their mainstream 
sectoral and national development planning. The benefit of this integration effort, often referred to 
as “mainstreaming”, would be to reduce the sensitivity of development activities to both today’s 
and tomorrow’s climate, thus ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of investments. India, 
for example, has adopted policies to reduce risks and enhance the adaptive capacity of its most 
vulnerable sectors and groups. The policies are primarily driven by the objective of ensuring 
sustainable livelihoods and alleviating poverty. For example, adaptation in the agricultural sector 
includes the development of drought-resistant crop varieties, the promotion of crop diversification 
and the extension of the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme. Overall, India reports to be 
spending 2% of its gross domestic product on adaptation activities in the areas of agriculture, water 
resources, health and sanitation, coastal zones, forests and disaster risk reduction (Ray, 2007). 
Discussions on mainstreaming are most advanced in the context of ODA, which still contributes a 
substantial share to the income of many developing countries, particularly the least developed 
countries (LDCs). In April 2006 the OECD organised a ministerial-level meeting of its 
Development Assistance Committee and its Environment Policy Committee. The meeting served to 
launch a process to work in partnership with developing countries to integrate environmental 
factors efficiently into national development policies and poverty reduction strategies. The 
outcomes of the meeting were an agreed Framework for Common Action Around Shared Goals, as 
well as a Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Cooperation. FINANCING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE | 5 
 
These outcomes are providing an impetus to all development agencies to consider climate change 
in their operations and thus facilitate mainstreaming. The OECD is currently preparing practical 
guidance for doing so. 
Priorities for Adaptation in Developing Countries 
Since 2001 the LDCs have been preparing national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), 
which allow these countries to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate 
adaptation needs. The rationale for preparing NAPAs is based on the limited ability of LDCs to 
adapt and the recognition that activities proposed through NAPAs would be those whose further 
delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage. So far 38 LDCs have 
completed their NAPAs, of which eleven are now in various stages of implementing priority 
activities. 
One of the features of the NAPAs is that they do not establish a parallel planning process but rather 
attempt to build on national development goals and integrate adaptation into existing national 
plans. For example, Gambia established a project steering committee chaired by a Permanent 
Secretary, with representatives from the National Assembly and from government departments 
responsible for budgetary issues, poverty alleviation, and oversight of local government and 
decentralisation. In many LDCs the NAPA process has strengthened institutional capacity at the 
national level, thus improving the countries’ ability to integrate adaptation into sectoral planning 
and decision-making. Rwanda, for example, identifies adaptation as a development priority in its 
latest Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), which covers the period 
2008–11. Rwanda aims to develop sectoral strategies to implement the EDRPS while taking into 
account the priorities it identified in its NAPA. 
Collectively the NAPAs give a good indication of the kind of adaptation activities that are seen as 
high priority by the large and diverse group of least developed countries. Additional insights are 
gained from other UNFCCC national reporting mechanisms, such as the National Communications 
and the Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), and from regional workshops. In a review of the 
17 NAPAs that had been completed by June 2007, the UNFCCC secretariat found that agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries is by far the most prioritised sector, followed by water supplies, extreme 
events, and capacity building (UNFCCC, 2007a). Infrastructure was not identified as a priority 
sector, which is at least in part due to the fact that infrastructure for, for example, flood protection 
was classified in the sector extreme events. The prioritisation of the agriculture and water sectors, 
which are key to many developing-country economies and livelihoods, suggests that adaptation is 
indeed closely connected to the need for broad economic and social development. The measures 
proposed in the NAPAs for these sectors would reduce vulnerability to climate variability as well 
as to climate change. The need for development within these sectors is augmented rather than 
created by the climate change challenge. The 2008 update of UNFCCC (2007a) will incorporate a 
review of all 38 NAPAs that are currently available. 
The TNAs submitted by Parties give a similar message. A review by the UNFCCC secretariat 
found that 62.5% of Parties had identified agriculture and fisheries as a priority sector for 
adaptation technology. In particular, crop management was seen as a priority issue. Other priority 
sectors identified by Parties were coastal zone management, water, and health (UNFCCC, 2007a). 
Of the 17 NAPAs considered by the UNFCCC secretariat, 16 included cost estimates of the 
prioritised adaptation activities. These 16 NAPAs had been prepared by Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burundi, Cambodia, the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Haiti, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Rwanda, Samoa and Senegal. The total cost estimate for these countries was $292 
million, with individual country estimates ranging from $3.6 million for the Comoros to $74 
million for Bangladesh. Table 1 lists the priority activities by sector as identified in the NAPAs, 6 | KLEIN & PERSSON 
 
along with the total cost estimates of the 16 NAPAs for each sector. A slightly more recent review 
of 22 NAPAs by Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) arrived at an estimated total cost of priority 
adaptation activities of $472 million. 
As for the type of adaptation activities identified in the NAPAs, Table 1 suggests that developing 
countries need a mix of ‘hard’, technological measures and ‘soft’ measures for reducing 
vulnerability and building adaptive capacity. For example, promoting agricultural techniques and 
irrigation methods to fight salinity is proposed along with economic diversification of vulnerable 
rural communities and research on crop varieties. The NAPAs suggest that the LDCs are not biased 
towards either end of the adaptation continuum (Figure 1) but instead recognise the need for 
comprehensive strategies. 
Table 1. Adaptation activities to meet urgent and immediate needs of the least developed countries, 
as expressed in the NAPAs, including aggregate cost estimates  
Sector and prioritised activities  Total cost estimate 
in 16 NAPAS  
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries – resistant crop and livestock varieties, 
diversification of activities for rural communities, advancing food security (seed 
and food banks), community-based forest projects, improving veterinary 
services, promoting agricultural techniques and irrigation methods to fight 
salinity 
$129 million 
Water supplies – protect water infrastructure, improve management of surface 
water, construct storage facilities, water-harvesting, improve watershed 
management and monitoring, raise community awareness 
$50 million 
Extreme events – installation of early-warning systems, measures for flood 
prevention (e.g. flood dykes) and coping with droughts, community disaster 
preparedness and response capacity 
$35 million 
Capacity building incl. research – upgrade meteorological services, explore 
options for insurance, research on crop varieties, awareness-raising and 
information dissemination 
$35 million 
Coastal zones – integrated coastal zone management, construct and upgrade 
coastal defences and causeways, mangrove planting 
$15 million 
Natural ecosystems  $12 million 
Infrastructure – development of communications and telecommunications 
infrastructure, road protection 
$6 million 
Human health – development of health infrastructures, increase immunisation, 
measures to combat spread of malaria, training and awareness raising of 
medical personnel 
$3 million 
National policies  $3 million 
Source: UNFCCC (2007a). 
In addition to identifying concrete and sector-specific adaptation measures, developing countries 
also articulated their needs and priorities with regards to generic and cross-sectoral measures for 
facilitating adaptation and building adaptive capacity. In 2007 the UNFCCC secretariat held three 
regional workshops and one expert meeting to assist in the identification of specific adaptation 
needs and concerns in developing countries, at the request of the COP. A total of 96 developing 
countries participated in these meetings. The workshop synthesis (UNFCCC, 2007b) showed that a 
menu of generic tools and means for adaptation is needed, including capacity building for FINANCING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE | 7 
 
conducting vulnerability and adaptation assessment, establishment of hydro-meteorological 
networks, promotion of regional collaboration and centres of excellence, improvement of climate 
data and modelling techniques, and integration of top-down and bottom-up (community-based) 
approaches to adaptation assessment. In addition, participants in the Nairobi Work Programme 
workshop on adaptation planning and practices called for integration across sectors, levels and 
development (UNFCCC, 2007c). 
Current Sources of Adaptation Finance 
In spite of the many efforts already made by developing countries, in many cases external support 
will be required to meet adaptation needs. Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC commits developed 
countries to assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects. This assistance is 
understood to come in the form of new and additional funding (i.e. beyond what developed 
countries are already planning to provide as ODA). 
In 2001 COP7 established three funds to support adaptation activities in developing countries: the 
Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund under the UNFCCC, and 
the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol. The two funds under the UNFCCC are operational 
and managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), as is the Strategic Priority “Piloting an 
Operational Approach to Adaptation”, which the GEF established under its Trust Fund. The 
operational GEF funds provide funding to eligible countries to meet the additional costs of 
adaptation. The remaining costs are to be borne either by the recipient country and/or by other 
bilateral or multilateral donors. As of March 2008, $270 million had been pledged for adaptation 
under the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, of which $50 
million has been allocated. The GEF will present an update of these numbers at COP14, but they 
are unlikely to be very different. 
The Adaptation Fund is not yet operational. As decided by the COP serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in 2007, it will be managed by a special Adaptation Fund 
Board (AFB). The AFB is developing specific operational policies and guidelines to be approved 
by the CMP in Poznan in December 2008. The Adaptation Fund is the first financial instrument 
under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol that is not based solely on voluntary contributions from 
donor countries. It receives a 2% share of proceeds from project activities under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and can also receive funds from other sources to fund concrete 
adaptation projects. The actual amount of money that will be available from the fund depends on 
how much the CDM is used and on the price of carbon. According to a World Bank estimate it is 
likely to total $100–500 million by 2012, possibly increasing to $2 billion per year thereafter 
(Noble, 2008). Watkins (2007) estimated that the Adaptation Fund could generate between $160–
950 million by 2012. 
In many developing countries ODA can play a major part in supporting adaptation. The OECD 
estimated that in Nepal, for example, as much as 50–65% of total ODA is directed at activities 
potentially affected by climate risks (Agrawala, 2005). At the same time, more than 60% of all 
ODA from OECD countries could positively contribute towards adaptation and adaptive capacity 
(Levina, 2007). This suggests that it is possible to create synergies between ODA and adaptation 
investments, for example through mainstreaming. On the other hand, the current set up of 
adaptation funding under the UNFCCC and the tendency of ODA to move from supporting project-
based activities towards providing programme and budget support may make it difficult for 
mainstreaming to happen in practice. At the same time, however, the need for adaptation 
investments in developing countries becomes increasingly evident, and the willingness of 
developed countries to make funds available increases as well. 8 | KLEIN & PERSSON 
 
Nonetheless, developing countries are concerned that as a result of donors’ seeking to create 
synergies, funding for adaptation will not be new and additional but in effect will be absorbed into 
ODA budgets of a fixed or even decreasing size. The concern is fuelled by the fact that the amount 
of money available in the current funds for adaptation is only a fraction of the aforementioned 
estimated investment needs in developing countries. Moreover, only a handful of countries have 
achieved the target, reaffirmed most recently in Monterrey, of providing 0.7% of their gross 
national income as ODA. The OECD (2008) estimated that in 2006 only about $40 billion was 
available as “programmable aid” (i.e. total ODA less debt-forgiveness grants, bilateral 
humanitarian aid, administration costs, in-donor country refugee costs and imputed student costs), 
which again is considerably less than some of the aforementioned investment needs for adaptation. 
A second, related concern is that mainstreaming could divert any new and additional funds for 
adaptation into more general development activities, which limits the opportunity to evaluate, at 
least quantitatively, their benefits with respect to climate change specifically. Third, there is 
concern that donors’ use of ODA to pursue mainstreamed adaptation could impose conditionalities 
on what should be a country-driven process. Table 2 summarises the pros and cons of both stand-
alone adaptation and mainstreamed adaptation in the context of adaptation funding. 
Table 2. Pros and cons of stand-alone adaptation and mainstreamed adaptation in the context of 
adaptation funding, as perceived and expressed during UNFCCC negotiations 
 Stand-alone  adaptation  Mainstreamed  adaptation 
Pro  Easy to calculate new and additional funding needs 
Greater country ownership 
More efficient in implementation 
More effective, more sustainable impacts 
Con  High administrative costs when scaled up 
Synergies with development may be missed 
Difficult funding situation, possibly diverting ODA 
Seen as imposing conditionalities 
Source: Klein (2008). 
To address these concerns it will be necessary for the developed and developing countries to 
develop a mutual understanding that leads to agreed answers to the following two questions (Klein, 
2008): 
•  Should adaptation be designed as stand-alone activities or should it be mainstreamed into 
development projects and programmes? 
•  Should the provision of support for adaptation follow the polluter-pays principle or is it an 
additional focus of ODA? 
In reality these questions are not either/or questions, as the answers depend on the type of 
adaptation being considered and on what it is trying to achieve (see Figure 1). However, the current 
climate negotiations under the UNFCCC, in particular those on adaptation funding for developing 
countries, are leaving little room for such nuance. Moreover, within the context of the negotiations 
the two questions are related, and the absence of an agreed answer to the second question renders 
the first question politically charged. What is essentially an operational question has become a 
political question that uses “stand-alone adaptation” and “mainstreamed adaptation” as proxies for 
different negotiation perspectives on adaptation funding. As mentioned above, developing 
countries are concerned that efforts to promote the mainstreaming of adaptation are in fact a ploy 
of the developed countries to avoid providing new and additional funding for adaptation. As 
recently as the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies meeting in June 2008, developing countries called for 
stand-alone adaptation activities, as these would allow for the measurable, reportable and verifiable 
use of new and additional funding, as stipulated in the Bali Action Plan. FINANCING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE | 9 
 
Modalities of Future Adaptation Financing 
Regardless of whether they are used to support stand-alone or mainstreamed activities, existing and 
expected resources fall short of the estimated costs of adaptation by roughly two orders of 
magnitude. Substantially more financial resources are needed. A number of developed countries 
and development banks are in the process of setting up separate ODA-based funds that could also 
support adaptation activities in developing countries, thus complementing or competing with the 
GEF funds and the Adaptation Fund. The new funds, which all target both mitigation and 
adaptation, include the Environmental Transformation Fund of the United Kingdom, Japan’s Cool 
Earth Partnership, the International Climate Protection Initiative of Germany, and the Climate 
Investment Funds created under the World Bank. In September 2008, 10 countries (Australia, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States) pledged a total of more than $6.1 billion to the Climate Investment Funds, which 
include a Clean Technology Fund and a Strategic Climate Fund. Part of the latter fund is the Pilot 
Program for Climate Resilience, which will support adaptation. $642.5 million of the $6.1 billion 
have been allocated for this. In addition to these funds, the European Commission and the World 
Bank are discussing a Global Climate Financing Mechanism. For more details about adaptation 
financing modalities and the proposed funds see Haites (2008), Müller (2008) and Porter et al. 
(2008). 
In spite of the promise of additional funding for adaptation, there has been concern that these funds 
are donor-driven, that money may be made available as loans instead of grants, and that possible 
competition between these funds and those under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol may lead to 
a decoupling of adaptation and mitigation in the climate negotiations. Taking adaptation financing 
largely off the agenda of the negotiations could undermine the developing countries’ position that 
support for adaptation is a moral imperative for the developed countries, which has to go hand in 
hand with emission reductions. It could therefore limit developing countries’ willingness to accept 
mitigation actions and, as a result, weaken the carbon market. The carbon market, created by the 
Kyoto Protocol, has the potential to move huge financial flows to developing countries for 
mitigation and adaptation. In theory the carbon market could make a future climate agreement self-
financing: if emission targets were ambitious the price of carbon would rise significantly, which 
would increase financial flows to developing countries. 
The aforementioned Adaptation Fund is the first example of the use of market-based options to 
generate substantial financial resources to address climate change (as opposed to using ODA). 
However, instead of taxing carbon emissions (which would be in line with the polluter-pays 
principle), it taxes carbon exchanges, which provides a disincentive to investments in developing 
countries. Nonetheless, developing countries and many non-governmental organisations see the 
institutional set-up of the Adaptation Fund as superior to those of the separate funds that are being 
established (e.g. Porter et al., 2008). In particular the direct representation of developing countries 
on the AFB and the fact that applicant countries can choose their own implementing entities are 
seen as strong improvements on the existing GEF-managed funds under the UNFCCC. The GEF 
has been criticised for the way in which it has managed the funds for adaptation under the 
UNFCCC (e.g. Möhner & Klein, 2007), and it has yet to gain widespread support for its role as the 
secretariat of the AFB. 
In addition to the current 2% levy on the CDM, the carbon market can be used in a number of 
different ways to generate financial resources for adaptation. This year Norway, Switzerland, China 
and Mexico have all submitted proposals to this effect, while the Philippines on behalf of the G77 
and China, and the European Union have made submissions that discuss the funding architecture. 
Müller (2008) discussed the options put forward by Parties as well as other options, including a 
levy on air travel. He argued that the options for generating adaptation funding should meet at least 
five criteria: new and additional, predictable, appropriate, equitable, and adequate. He found that 10 | KLEIN & PERSSON 
 
funding schemes whereby money is raised and disbursed through national budgets (such as China’s 
proposal that developed countries make available 0.5% of their gross domestic product for 
adaptation in developing countries) do not meet the criteria, in particular the predictability 
criterion. The proposals that foresee raising funds through international markets (i.e. the CDM 
levy, the Norwegian proposal, the international aviation levy, and the international maritime 
emissions reduction scheme) satisfy more of the criteria, except adequacy. Müller (2008) 
concluded that the most interesting option could be the Norwegian proposal for an international 
auction of assigned amount units and some form of solidarity levy on bunker fuel activities. 
Official national and multilateral strategies for adaptation in developing countries focus on public 
policies and investments, but there is also an emerging interest in private or public/private 
partnership initiatives on adaptation, and how public policy can stimulate such initiatives. In 
particular, several potential insurance-related options have been identified, including multi-state 
risk pooling mechanisms, regional reinsurance facilities, catastrophe funds linked to international 
financial markets, national/regional disaster funds supported financially by the international 
community, micro-insurance, generation of carbon credits in exchange for support for insurance, 
and weather derivatives that provide payouts in response to weather triggers rather than in response 
to demonstrated losses (UNFCCC, 2007b). This diverse group of options involves different kinds 
of burden-sharing between public bodies and private individuals, as well as between developing 
countries and developed countries. Further dialogues with the private sector, in particular the 
finance sector, would be needed to pursue these options. 
Issues to Consider by Negotiators 
In the Investment and Financial Flows report, the UNFCCC secretariat identified the needs to scale 
up current levels of adaptation funding, to involve the private sector, and to optimise governance 
structures (UNFCCC, 2007a). Yet there are several other contentious issues in the current debate 
on adaptation financing. They revolve not only around the amounts required, the sources of 
funding and the delivery mechanisms, but also around the moral and legal framing of adaptation 
financing. 
The European Union and other Annex I Parties tend to describe bilateral or multilateral funding as 
catalytic and complementary only to domestic and private funding by developing countries, 
whereas developing countries view adaptation funding as compensation for harm imposed on them. 
It is a universal ethical principle that it is wrong to harm others (or risk harming them) for one’s 
own gain, and that one owes compensation if one does such harm. Over time this moral principle 
has become firmly encoded in national case law and legal reasoning with respect to environmental 
pollution within national boundaries. International law echoes the same principle. The Stockholm 
Declaration of 1972 declares in Principle 21 (reaffirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration) that 
states have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction” and reiterates in Principle 22 that “States shall cooperate to develop further the 
international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas 
beyond their jurisdiction”. Thus, there is a legal basis for a principle-based and transparent process 
for determining national burden-sharing contributions to international adaptation funding. 
The aforementioned concerns of developing countries about the possible inadvertent consequences 
of mainstreaming need to be taken seriously. Steps need to be taken to reassure developing 
countries that there will indeed be new and additional funding for adaptation, which complements 
rather than competes with ODA. To this end it will be necessary to be clear about the two questions 
mentioned earlier. As for the first question (Should adaptation be designed as stand-alone activities 
or should it be mainstreamed into development projects and programmes?), there is no need to FINANCING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE | 11 
 
make an a priori decision for stand-alone adaptation or for mainstreaming. Instead, the choice of 
one or the other should be an outcome of a country-driven national planning process. National 
adaptation planning in developing countries needs to be supported under the UNFCCC, and 
developed countries must provide follow-up support to implement adaptation activities identified in 
these national plans. 
As for the second question (Should the provision of support for adaptation follow the polluter-pays 
principle or is it an additional focus of ODA?) it then depends on the nature of these activities 
whether ODA or new and additional funding is most appropriate to support adaptation to climate 
change. ODA could be used to support activities that fit in the two boxes on the left-hand side of 
Figure 1 (addressing the drivers of vulnerability and building response capacity), while new and 
additional funding could support activities corresponding with the two boxes on the right-hand side 
(managing climate risks and confronting climate change). The COP should provide clarity on how 
traditional ODA, the Adaptation Fund and various other bilateral and multilateral funds for 
adaptation can complement one another. 
As mentioned earlier, the carbon market provides an excellent opportunity to generate new and 
additional funds for adaptation. Germany has been quick to realise this. It earmarked 8.8% of the 
proceeds of this year’s auction of allocated emission rights to adaptation and mitigation activities. 
Half of this would be used domestically, the other half in developing countries. Such earmarking of 
public funds is not legally possible in all OECD member states, but this situation may change 
during the negotiations. However, while Germany is creating new and additional funds, it has also 
stated its intention to consider as ODA the 4.4% that is to be spent in developing countries. This 
runs the risk of undermining ongoing efforts to meet the target of providing 0.7% of gross national 
product as conventional ODA. It could also fuel developing countries’ concerns that adaptation 
funding leads to a diversion of ODA at the expense of non-climate issues. 
Finally, clarity needs to be created on the emergence and use of the various bilateral and 
multilateral funds for adaptation. Confusion and a lack of transparency due to a proliferation of 
funds are the last things developing countries need when seeking support for their adaptation 
activities. As stated by the chair in his summary of views expressed during the second session of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UNFCCC, 
2008), “Parties expressed concern over the fragmentation of available funding both within and 
outside the UNFCCC process and the conditions imposed for accessing it. The need to understand 
and remedy these constraints by streamlining funding mechanisms was emphasized.” In addition, 
“[m]any Parties expressed their preference for a funding mechanism for adaptation that is governed 
within the ambit of the Convention and emphasized the need for funding that is appropriate, 
sufficient and predictable” (UNFCCC, 2008). 
The Adaptation Fund is not yet operational and there is the risk of it being overshadowed by other 
funds, mentioned earlier. One way of creating clarity on the distinction between the funds would be 
to feed new and additional resources to the Adaptation Fund (including but not limited to those 
generated by the carbon market, and use the fund to support concrete adaptation activities (i.e. the 
activities represented by the two right-hand boxes in Figure 1). The donor-initiated funds could 
then be fed by contributions that count as ODA, and these funds would be used to support the 
activities in the two left-hand boxes in Figure 1).   
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